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THE NEW FRINGE BENEFIT LEGISLATION: A
CODIFICATION OF HISTORICAL
INEQUITIES
Wendy Gerzog Shaller *
When Representative Fortney (Pete) Stark announced the hearing on the
pending fringe benefit legislation,' he stated that the bill was intended to
present a permanent solution to the inequitable treatment given cash and
noncash (or in-kind) compensation. He suggested that the absence of defini-
tive rules governing nonstatutory fringe benefits had led to "uncertainty and
inconsistencies in the current administration of tax laws ... ."' However,
the fringe benefit provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (1984 Tax Act
or Tax Reform Act) fall short of accomplishing these goals. Instead, the
new provisions have merely concretized some of the historical inequities be-
tween cash and noncash compensation while continuing to erode the tax
base.
The 1984 Tax Act excludes from gross income "any fringe benefit which
qualifies as a (1) no-additional-cost service, (2) qualified employee discount,
(3) working condition fringe or (4) de minimis fringe." 4 Additionally, the
Tax Reform Act amends section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) to
allow for an exclusion for qualified tuition reductions granted to employees
of educational institutions.5
A no-additional-cost service is defined as an employer-provided service
that is available to customers in the ordinary course of the employer's busi-
ness, without costing the employer substantial additional revenue (including
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. B.A., Clark University 1968;
M.A., Assumption College 1971; J.D., University of Akron School of Law 1976; LL.M., Na-
tional Law Center, George Washington University 1979. Professor Shaller was employed at
the United States Tax Court from 1979 to 1982.
1. Tax Reform Act of 1984 (Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984), Pub. L.
No. 98-369, §§ 531-532, 98 Stat. 877-87 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 132, 133, 117(d) (1984)) [herein-
after cited as 1984 Tax Act].
2. Rules for the Federal Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means, H.R. 3525, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Hearings].
3. See Frayed at the Fringes, Wash. Post, July 23, 1984, at A14, col. 1.
4. I.R.C. § 132(a) (1984).
5. Id. § 117(d).
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foregone revenue). 6 A qualified employee discount entitles employees to a
discount below customer cost on "qualified property or services" (that is,
services or property, other than real property or investment personalty, that
is offered to customers in the employer's ordinary line of business).7 The
price offered to employees must not be in excess of the gross profit percent-
age' of the publicly offered price for property or twenty percent of the pub-
licly offered price for services.9 The no-additional-cost services and qualified
employee discounts are subject to a nondiscrimination rule;1 ° the working
condition and de minimis fringe exclusions, however, generally are not. A
working condition fringe benefit is any employer-provided property or ser-
vice which, if paid for by the employee, would be deductible as an ordinary
and necessary business expense.11 A de minimis fringe benefit is one that has
such insignificant value (taking into account the frequency the benefit is of-
fered by the employer) that accounting for it is unreasonable and administra-
tively impractical. 2 With the exception of subsidized eating facilities, a de
minimis fringe benefit is not subject to the nondiscrimination requirement. 3
Admittedly, both working condition fringe benefits and de minimis fringe
benefits may be justified on the ground of administrative convenience; they
add to the simplification of the tax laws and do not produce inequitable re-
sults. A working condition fringe, for example, substitutes an exclusion for
what would have been an inclusion and a matching business deduction
under previous tax"lawtl4
With respect to no-additional-cost services and qualified employee dis-
counts, however, Congress has added simplicity at the price of eroding the
tax base and codifying favoritism to specific industries. Congress has histori-
6. Id. § 132(b).
7. Id. § 132(c)(4).
8. The term "gross profit percentage" is defined as the ratio of the excess of the total
sales price of property over such property's total cost, to the property's total sales price. I.R.C.
§ 132(c)(2)(A) (1984). For example, the sale of merchandise for $1,000,000 that cost $600,000
yields a gross profit percentage of 40% ($1,000,000 - $600,000 = $400,000; $400,000/
$1,000,000 = 40%). H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 294 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
1983 H.R. REP.].
9. I.R.C. § 132(c)(1) (1984).
10. Id. § 132(h)(1).
11. Id. § 132(d). The House bill, H.R. 4170, subjected employee parking to the nondis-
crimination requirement. The conference agreement, however, deleted this requirement. See
Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1172 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
1984 Conference Report].
12. I.R.C. § 132(e) (1984). Historically, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) has ruled
that fringe benefits of minimal cost are excludable. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58, 1959-1 C.B. 17
(holding that hams, turkeys, etc. distributed to employees are nontaxable income).
13. See I.R.C. § 132(e)(2) (1984).
14. See id. § 132(d).
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cally shown partiality to certain businesses (for example, the insurance' 5 and
housing industries' 6), for arguably legitimate public interest purposes. By
contrast, in the Tax Reform Act, Congress has shown a preference for the
airline, university, and retail establishment industries for no apparent reason.
Employees in these businesses can take a large percentage of their income in
the form of nontaxable fringe benefits and thereby shift the cost of these
benefits to all other taxpayers by way of higher taxes on their taxable
income.' 7
In the past, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) and courts have fairly
consistently characterized noncash payments to executives as taxable in-
come. 8 Congress has now chosen to underscore the tax consequences of
these discriminatory fringe benefits by codifying the historically inequitable
and theoretically unjustifiable exclusions of no-additional-cost services and
employee discounts. The primary examples of these new statutory exclu-
sions are airline passes, free tuition, and merchandise discounts.19 Sears,
Roebuck, and Company, a major retailer, estimates that in 1982 its em-
ployee discount amounted to eighty-three million dollars. 20 Airline passes
may well amount to thousands of dollars per employee.2 ' College tuition for
two children could easily constitute an $18,000 fringe benefit for a faculty
.15. See id. § 101(a)(l) (1984) (insurance death benefit exclusion); id. § 101(b) ($5,000 em-
ployee death benefit exclusion); id. § 101(d) (special annual interest exclusion for life insurance
proceeds paid in installments); id. § 104 (exclusion for insurance payments for personal injury
or sickness); id. § 79 (exclusion for the employer-paid expense for the first $50,000 of group-
term life insurance).
16. See id. § 163 (1984) (deduction for mortgage payments); id. § 1034 (rollover of gain
provisions on the sale of one's principal residence); id. § 121 ($125,000 lifetime exclusion of
gain on sale of one's personal residence for taxpayers over 55 years old); id. §§ 167, 168 (bene-
fits given owners of residential rental property, particularly for low-income-housing units, and
special deductions for the rehabilitation of old property); id. § 1050 (limited recapture
provision).
17. See Frayed at the Fringes, supra note 3.
18. See, e.g., United Aniline Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1963) (president
and principal stockholder's personal use of corporate yacht constitutes income to him); Inter-
national Artists, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 94 (1970) (taxpayer Liberace's personal use of
corporate house and furnishing constitutes taxable income equal to an allocable portion of the
fair rental value of the property); Rev. Rul. 13, 1973-1 C.B. 42 (financial counseling expenses
paid by corporation for its executives are taxable income).
19. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Hon. John E. Chapoton, Asst.
Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury).
20. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at 198 (statement of William E. Sanders, Vice Presi-
dent, Personnel, Sears, Roebuck & Co.).
21. Certainly, if an airline employee, accompanied by his/her spouse and two children,
takes several trips each year, the employee receives a fringe benefit exceeding $1,000; for the
frequent traveler, the benefit could well amount to more than $10,000, particularly for an
employee of an international airline.
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member.22
It is true that the Tax Reform Act, in affirming the exemption given to
historically tax free benefits, affixed a nondiscrimination requirement to their
exclusion. The exclusion does not apply to noncash benefits that are dis-
criminatory (that is, available only to executives or highly compensated em-
ployees). A tax free benefit must be available to a reasonable classification of
employees and not discriminate in favor of those at the top.
23
Historically, tax free benefits have been justified on the basis that they
reflect some noncompensatory business motivation on the part of employers
to familiarize their employees with their goods and services.24 There is no
sufficient social policy, however, to justify the erosion of the tax base by
excluding these now statutory fringe benefits. 25 If these benefits have a sig-
nificant valid business purpose apart from providing additional compensa-
tion, they would qualify under working condition exclusions. On the other
hand, if their value were truly insignificant, exclusion would be allowed as a
de minimis fringe benefit. The exclusion of these benefits, unfortunately,
seems more the result of lobbying efforts by special interest groups,26 and a
general feeling that the employees are middle class and "they do not have
the tax shelters of the rich . . ,27
In addition to codifying historical inequities, Congress has effectively cre-
ated a new index for the determination of taxable income. By instituting a
no-additional-cost standard, Congress is shifting its attention from what the
employee receives to the employer's expenditure in order to determine the
extent to which the employee is enriched. Prior to the fringe benefit legisla-
tion, the Internal Revenue Code was clear: "Gross income means all income
from whatever source derived . ,.28 Previously, any examination of em-
ployer cost served merely to facilitate the determination of value to the tax-
22. Examples of tuition costs for the 1984-85 school year reveal this fact: Amherst Col-
lege, $8,911; Harvard University, $9,660; Stanford University, $9,027; Rutgers University,
$1,854 (for state residents); State University of New York (Binghamton), $1,496; University of
California (Berkeley), $1,361. See BARRON'S PROFILES OF AMERICAN COLLEGES (14th ed.
1984).
23. See I.R.C. § 132(h)(i) (1984).
24. See 1983 H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 286-87.
25. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at 7-8 (statement of Hon. John E. Chapoton, Asst.
Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury); 1983 H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 305
(noting the new fringe benefit legislation will not result in any additional revenue).
26. See Frayed at the Fringes, supra note 3 (observation that both the President and Con-
gress tried to avoid taxing historically tax free benefits). See also Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No.
164, at G-2 (Aug. 23, 1983).
27. 129 CONG. REC. S13,295 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1983) (statement of Sen. Jepsen).
28. I.R.C. § 61 (1982) (emphasis added).
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payer.29 Now, integral to the test of exclusion for certain fringe benefits is
the employer's expense and not the employee's income. This new attention
is a theoretical departure from general taxing principles without explanation
for this sudden change in policy.
I. THE SERVICE'S HISTORICAL ROLE
Much of the blame for the inequity and theoretical innovation belongs to
the Service. Historically, it has provided little consistency in its approach to
in-kind compensation.
In 1921, the Service ruled that free railroad passes to employees were non-
taxable gifts.3" After World War II, when airplanes became the common
mode of travel, airline employees were not taxed on the passes afforded them
and their families. In Commissioner v. Duberstein,31 the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished compensation from a nontaxable gift, requiring that the latter be
made from a "detached or disinterested generosity." Following this deci-
sion, instead of reversing its earlier position in the 1921 revenue ruling, the
Service continued to exclude railroad and airline employee passes from in-
come. Yet, under Duberstein, these passes cannot be considered gifts and are
clearly compensation.
Similarly, the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury in
1956 excluded, as scholarship, tuition remitted by any participating educa-
tional institution because the student was a child of a faculty member.32
Yet, in 1969, the United States Supreme Court in Bingler v. Johnson,3 3 dis-
tinguished compensation from scholarship by defining scholarships as "rela-
tively disinterested, no strings educational grants, with no requirements of
any substantial quid pro quo from the recipient." 34 Applying the Johnson
criteria to tuition benefits, the Service certainly could have taxed tuition re-
mission benefits as compensation to faculty members.
In 1975, the Service issued proposed regulations35 that allowed an em-
ployer to provide all employees those fringe benefits in its line of business
that did not effect additional costs to the employer. The example given in
the proposed regulations was free standby travel for airline employees.36 At
29. See, e.g., United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968); McDonald v. Com-
missioner, 66 T.C. 223 (1976).
30. O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110 (1921).
31. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (1957).
33. 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
34. Id. at 751.
35. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(a) (cited in 40 Fed. Reg. 41,119 (1975)).
.36. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,119 (1975).
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the end of the following year, however, these proposed regulations were
withdrawn due to public criticism.37 It is curious that the Service made this
proposal to exempt no additional-cost-services despite the Duberstein and
Johnson decisions.
Subsequently, in November 1976, the Service singled out tuition remission
benefits for professors from all fringe benefits, and announced that these ben-
efits were taxable compensation instead of scholarships.3" Following a pub-
lic hearing two months later, however, the Service announced that this
proposed change in the scholarship regulations was being withdrawn.39
A major shift in the Service's attitude occurred in January 1981, when it
announced a revised draft of the fringe benefit regulations under Code sec-
tion 61.40 According to the Service, all fringe benefits, except those relating
to working conditions and administrative convenience, were to be character-
ized as taxable income includible at their fair market value. The first two
illustrations of the proposed rules, which pertained to those fringe benefits
concerned with gross income derived from the personal use of property,
services, or facilities, refer to airline passes and tuition remission:
Example (1). F, a flight attendant in the employ of A, an airline
company, and F's spouse decide to spend their 1984 annual vaca-
tion in Europe. A has a policy whereby any of its employees, along
with members of their immediate families, may take a number of
personal flights annually for a nominal charge. F and F's spouse
take advantage of this policy and fly to and from Europe. The
value of the two round-trip flights, less the nominal charge actually
paid, is includable in F's gross income ...
Example (2). P, a professor in the employ of U, a university, has
a child who will be entering college in September of 1984. U has a
policy whereby it remits, pays or reimburses the tuition of any em-
ployee, or spouse or child of such employee, who attends that uni-
versity or any other educational institution that participates in a
reciprocal tuition remission plan. If P's child participates in such a
plan, the value of the tuition remitted, paid or reimbursed will be
includable in P's gross income.41
With respect to employer product discounts, the draft allowed an exclusion
based on administrative convenience for a nondiscriminatory, no-additional-
37. 41 Fed. Reg. 5,634 (1976).
38. 41 Fed. Reg. 48,132 (1976).
39. Int. Rev. News Rel. IR-1735 (1977).
40. Treasury Department Discussion Draft of Proposed Income Tax Regulations on
Fringe Benefits, 1981 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 70,181 (not published in the Fed. Reg.) [hereinafter
cited as Proposed 1981 Regulations].
41. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-17(d) (1981).
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cost discount on a product or service that is available as part of the em-
ployer's trade or business. The discount could not exceed the lesser of
twenty percent of the public sales price or $100 per item for nonrepetitive
items or the lesser of twenty percent of the public sales price or $200 per
year for repetitive items.42 Pursuant to this provision, airline passes and
tuition remission would be taxable only if the discount exceeded the lesser of
twenty percent of the public sales price or $100 per item. An example given
under these provisions states that a railroad employee who receives a twenty
percent discount equal to $100 on a round trip ticket may exclude the dis-
count from his income.43 By analogy, the same exclusion is available to an
airline employee who is provided the same kind of discount. The proposed
regulations are unclear, however, regarding whether and to what extent tui-
tion remissions could qualify as employee discounts.' Furthermore, since
the drafted regulations did not include a cap on an employee's total yearly
exclusions, an employee could conceivably receive unlimited $100 discounts.
The Service almost immediately hedged its new position that fringe bene-
fits such as airline and railroad passes were taxable. It stated that in deter-
mining fair market value for fringe benefits, it would employ a discount
valuation rule that would take into account nontransferability, standby sta-
tus, and the limited choices involved in these benefits. The discount valua-
tion rule would apply only to goods and services produced or used in the
ordinary course of the employer's trade or business.45
The need for the discount valuation rule, however, is questionable. While
on the one hand, there are limitations on transferability and ability to con-
vert these benefits into cash, on the other hand, these benefits are not
purchased with after-tax dollars and many services sold to the public are
also subject to similar restrictions. The fact that the employee might not
have purchased the product or service without the incentive of the fringe
benefit is not a sufficient reason for discounting its value. Making a choice
based in part on low cost is an element of the concept of fair market value.
Finally, in the wake of the 1984 tax legislation, the Service issued Revenue
Procedure 84-14.46 The Service stated that it would refrain from issuing
42. Id. § 1.61-19(b)(1).
43. See id. § 1.61-19(c), example (3).
44. Under Proposed Reg. § 1.117-3(a), tuition remitted on or after January 1, 1984 would
be covered by Proposed Regs. §§ 1.61-17 through 1.61-20; however, none of the examples in
those subsections refer specifically to tuition remitted to children of faculty members.
45. See Hearing on the Taxation of Fringe Benefits Before the Subcomm. on Select Reve-
nue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means (Joint Statement by John E. Chapoton, Asst.
Secretary (Tax Policy) and Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service)
reprinted in Daily Tax Report (BNA) No. 92, at J-5 (May 13, 1981).
46. Rev. Proc. 14, 1984-1 C.B. 431.
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fringe benefit rules and regulations until after January 1, 1985.
II. CONGRESS' HISTORICAL ROLE
With the exception of its 1979 Task Force, which offered a discussion
draft of fringe benefit legislation,4 7 Congress has, until now, been hesitant to
enact any legislation on this subject. The 1979 Task Force discussion draft
excluded fringe benefits that: were available to at least a reasonable classifi-
cation of employees; imposed no substantial incremental cost on the em-
ployer; and whose total yearly value was insubstantial either in absolute
terms or in comparison to the employee's total compensation.4 8 Exclusions
were also provided for de minimis fringe benefits furnished to facilitate the
employee's work, and such other benefits as prescribed by the Secretary in
his regulations.49 Any other fringe benefit would be taxable and includible
at its fair market value less any consideration furnished by the employee.5"
Although more vague and therefore more difficult to apply than the 1984 tax
legislation, the 1979 discussion draft is similar in many ways. The 1984 Tax
Act, however, does not provide a ceiling on the total amount of nontaxable
fringe benefits an employee may receive.
Congress has recognized both the unpopularity of taxing tax-free benefits
("the great public and professional concern")5 I and its primary responsibil-
ity of legislating tax policy. 52 Legislation prohibiting the Treasury Depart-
ment from issuing final regulations relating to fringe benefits was first
enacted prior to 1980,"3 then prior to June 1, 1981,1 4 and finally prior to
December 31, 1983.' 5
The Tax Reform Act essentially codifies the existing "perception and ex-
pectation" that fringe benefits are not taxable income. 6 It also perpetuates
the inequitable treatment accorded to (1) university and preparatory school
families who receive tuition remission benefits tax free as opposed to the
taxable or restricted57 educational benefits offered by nonschool employers,
47. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS,
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS. (1979), reprinted in 57 Taxes
284, app. A (May 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 DISCUSSION DRAFT].
48. Id. at Prop. § 84(b).
49. Id. at Prop. § 84(c).
50. Id. at Prop. § 84(e)(2).
51. H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1981).
52. H.R. REP. No. 448, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979).
53. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996 (1978).
54. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979).
55. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 801, 95 Stat. 172, 349
(1981).
56. 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at I (statement of Rep. Stark).
57. See I.R.C. § 127 (1982) (effective for years 1979-1983).
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and (2) airline industry families who receive tax free passes, unlike employ-
ees of other industries who receive taxable bonuses, awards, or tip income.
Finally, the no-additional-cost criterion changes the focus from the tax-
payer's income to the employer's cost in order to determine the taxpayer's
taxable income.
III. DISPARATE TREATMENT FOR DISPARATE INDUSTRIES
A. Education Expenses
The 1984 Tax Act amends Code section 117 to allow a current, retired, or
disabled employee of an educational institution58 to exclude tuition remis-
sion, or cash grants, from his income. These benefits may be applied to ele-
mentary, secondary, or undergraduate education programs at the employee's
school or any other educational institution that maintains a reciprocal agree-
ment with that school as long as the tuition remission benefits are provided
on a nondiscriminatory basis.59 This fringe benefit afforded to school per-
sonnel and their families may be contrasted to the more limited provision
offered nonschool employees under a qualified plan or the job related re-
quirements affixed to the deductibility of educational expenses for all other
nonschool employees whose employer has not implemented such a program.
On October 11, 1984, Congress revived, modified, and extended a limited
exclusion previously available for tax years 1979 through 198360 until the
end of 1985.61 This exclusion is available to employees whose employer has
established a separate, written nondiscriminatory plan. The statute excludes
from taxation amounts furnished to an employee under a qualified plan even
58. See I.R.C. § 117(d)(2)(B) (1984) (referring to I.R.C. § 132(f) (1984)). Together these
sections allow the spouse, child, or widow(er) of the employee also to exclude tuition remission
benefits. A dependent child is a child (as defined in I.R.C. § 151(e)(3) (1984)), who is either a
dependent of the employee or an orphan child of a former employee. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(B)
(1984).
59. I.R.C. § 117(d) (1984).
60. I.R.C. § 127 was added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 164(a), 92
Stat. 2763 (1978).
61. H.R. 2568, passed by the 98th Congress and sent to the President on October 11,
1984, repealed the provision that terminated the educational assistance plan exclusion at the
end of 1983. The new law also removed the penalties on employees who did not withhold
payroll and income taxes on tuition payments after 1983. Finally H.R. 2568 required annual
information returns by employees with respect to these benefits.
Earlier in 1984, when the fringe benefit exclusion for school employees was passed, it ap-
peared to come simultaneously with the demise of I.R.C. § 127. See 1984 Conference Report,
supra note 11, at 1180. The Senate had proposed a two-year extension to the exclusion for
educational assistance benefits, but the conference agreement deleted the Senate amendment.
Id. See 24 TAX NOTES 1215 (1984) (for a synopsis of the alternative modifications that were
suggested for the education assistance exclusion).
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if these amounts do not meet the tests for deductibility of educational ex-
penses under treasury regulation section 1.162-5. This "off-again, on-again"
provision was enacted to erase the purportedly ambiguous and inequitable
restrictions in the regulations that stated an employee may not deduct the
cost of a course unless the course maintains or improves skills required by
the individual in his employment.62 The regulation was deemed especially
disadvantageous to lower level employees. 63 When this provision was re-
stored and extended through 1985, Congress attached a $5,000 per year cap
on the exclusion. While admittedly ineffective 64 as a means of preventing
the erosion of the tax base, the placement of any ceiling on these benefits
distinguishes them from the unlimited benefits of qualified tuition reduc-
tions.65 Unlike the 1984 fringe benefit exclusion available to school employ-
ees, the benefit offered by the educational assistance statute does not include
tuition remission of an employee's spouse or child.66
Except for employees of an educational institution, and except for the
temporary section 127 exclusion, such benefits have consistently been held to
be taxable compensation.67 In Johnson,68 the Supreme Court upheld the va-
lidity of treasury regulation section 1.117-4(c) that denies application of the
scholarship exclusion where the tuition remission represents "compensation
for past, present, or future services." '69 Similarly, in Armantrout v. Commis-
sioner,7° the Tax Court held that key employees whose children received
funds to defray college costs were taxable on these amounts under both Code
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (1973).
63. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-01 (1978). Ironically, it is the typically
lower paid employees of smaller businesses whose employer has not instituted a plan under
§ 127 who are subject to the confinements of the regulation.
64. See 130 CONG. REC. 10,477 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Gradison).
65. See, e.g., Kreiser, A New Standardfor Determining the Tax Treatment of Nonstatutory
Employee Fringe Benefits, 7 REV. OF TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 158 (1983). Although it has
been suggested that a similar ceiling be applied to all tax free fringe benefits, the imposition of a
cap does not prevent the erosion of the tax base and erase inequalities. If fringes are de
minimis, they will be excluded as de minimis fringe benefits; if they are substantial, they should
be taxed.
66. Where an employer, however, has an independently administered scholarship pro-
gram, a scholarship awarded on a competitive basis to an employee's child is not includible
income. See Chase v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (P-H) 265 (1960) (where the court held that
because all scholarship recipients were employees and not required to continue their employ-
ment, the awards were not given to further a business purpose).
67. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 484, 1957-2 C.B. 113 (where the Service ruled that employer's
reimbursement of educational expenses constitutes additional income to the employee). The
expenses, however, may be deductible if they comply with the requirements of Treas. Regs.
§ 1.162-5 (1984).
68. 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
69. Id. at 751.
70. 67 T.C. 996 (1977), af'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978).
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sections 61 and 83 because these benefits were based on the employees' per-
formance of services for their employer.7"
Although there appears to be no rational basis for this disparate treatment
accorded faculty families and all other employees and their families with
regard to tuition remission, a major argument for the distinction has been
that tax free tuition remission for faculty families has allowed educational
institutions to retain highly qualified faculty without additional cost to the
institutions. Yet, even if a faculty member in the twenty to thirty percent
bracket is taxed for these benefits, he is still getting an enormous discount on
his child's tuition. For example, a faculty member could receive a $5,000
tuition remission by paying only $1,000 to $1,500 to the Federal government
in taxes;72 most other parents of students, however, are paying the full
$5,000 tuition and with after-tax dollars. Moreover, not all faculty members
have families who take advantage of these benefits. Finally, faculty mem-
bers, like any other employees, who take courses themselves could exclude
the cost of these courses as a working condition fringe benefit where, if the
employee had paid for this service, he could have deducted its cost under
treasury regulation section 1.162-5 (after including the remission as income).
If, however, the classes selected do not constitute a working condition fringe
benefit, faculty members and other university employees, like their families,
would still receive a bargain on the cost of their classes since they are only
paying taxes on this benefit. There is no problem with valuing tuition remis-
sion because the tuition is easily reduced to a cash value; the new legislation
even excludes "cash grants" that clearly reflect a specific cash value.
Before the 1984 legislation was modified to include tax free treatment of
tuition benefits where an employee's institution had written a reciprocal
agreement with another institution, a representative of the American Associ-
ation of University Professors charged that without such tax free tuition re-
mission treatment, a faculty child's choice of educational institutions would
be restricted. In the absence of the modification, he asserted that the provi-
sion would discriminate against those faculty children who did not qualify
for admission to their parent's institution. 73 It is difficult, however, to un-
derstand how tuition remission for unqualified students is classified as
"scholarship" rather than additional compensation. In addition, such limi-
71. Id. at 1007 n.4. Rev. Rul. 448, 1975-2 C.B. 55, states that where an employer makes
available benefits under an educational benefit trust, provided the parent is a current employee,
when the child is eligible for benefits, the parent/employee has additional includible income at
the time of such vesting.
72. It would be difficult to accept the premise that a university could not retain a faculty
member in the 50% tax bracket without such tax-free fringe benefits.
73. 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at 173-77 (statement of Prof. William Collins).
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tations of choice placed on the children of faculty members do not reduce
the value of tuition remission benefits since many factors, including relative
cost, create limitations of choice for all students.
Unlike the broad exclusion for qualified tuition reduction benefits, limita-
tions are imposed on the educational assistance programs. Furthermore, an
employee working for a company not offering such a plan is restricted to the
deduction provided by treasury regulation section 1.162-5. There is no justi-
fication for the 1984 tax legislation that excludes tuition remission for both
the faculty member and his family at both the faculty member's institution
and any other institution with a written reciprocal agreement.
B. Valuation Problems: The Airline Employee Versus The Prize Winner
The Service's 1921 rationale for excluding travel passes to transportation
employees from taxable income was that the passes constituted nontaxable
gifts. 7 4 As a result of congressional inaction, such passes continued not to be
taxed; now, the Tax Reform Act has secured tax free status for these fringe
benefits.
It is unclear why Congress has conferred this tax benefit particularly upon
airline industry employees.7 5 Proponents of the legislation assert that with-
out the tax free status of airline passes there would be valuation and other
administrative difficulties.76 For example, "[h]ow much is the flight worth
when the airline employee may have to wait as long as 48 hours to get on an
open flight?" '77 It is argued that it would be "economically unrealistic" to
74. O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110 (1921) (railroad passes given to employees are nontaxable gifts).
75. Congress has, for instance, chosen to follow a different tack with respect to prize
winners, whose income was also considered at one time to be nontaxable gifts. See, e.g., Mc-
Dermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (prizes awarded in a contest moti-
vated by charitable or educational purposes were considered gifts); Campelio v. Commissioner,
24 T.C. 372 (1955) (prizes awarded where the winner did nothing to receive the prize were
deemed gifts); Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945). In response to these and other
cases holding that prizes constituted nontaxable gifts, Congress added § 74 to the 1954 Code.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 178 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4621, 4813. Since enactment of § 74, courts have rejected the gift theory for
prizes and awards. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 673 (D. Md. 1961), aff'd,
308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1962); Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428 (1967).
Of course, prizes and awards given to employees for special achievement have almost always
been treated as taxable income. See, e.g., Griggs v. United States, 314 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
Moreover, in Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952), the Supreme Court held that if
a prize was awarded pursuant to an enforceable contract obligation, this discharge of a legal
obligation was not a gift, but income. But see Jones v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.
1984), rev'g 79 T.C. 1008 (1982).
76. See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 160, at G-2 (Aug. 17, 1983).
77. 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at 143-44 (statement of Linda A. Puchala, President,
Association Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO).
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assume that the employee would pay the fair market value for these bene-
fits. 78 In addition, varieties of standby travel, priorities, and classes of ser-
vice would have to be considered in placing any value on the benefits.79
These same concerns, however, have not prevented prize winners, for in-
stance, from being taxed on their winnings."° . Valuation problems occurring
with respect to prizes awarded in-kind have been resolved. For example,
when a taxpayer won steamship tickets valued at their fair market value"' on
a radio program, a court held they were taxable at approximately two-thirds
of their retail cost because they were nontransferable and subject to other use
restrictions.8 2 Similarly, where an employee won an automobile which, after
10 days of use, he traded for another vehicle plus $1,000 in cash, he was
taxed on $3,900 (the dealer's cost for the vehicle received in the trade, plus
the cash and rental value of the automobile for its ten days of use) rather
than $4,453 (the employer's cost for the car).83
Special airfares sold to the public contain many restrictions on their trans-
ferability and use. Airline passes containing similar limitations could possi-
bly be valued at the lowest monthly cost for standby tickets or at the rate
other restrictive low fare tickets are sold to the public. Certainly, valuation
problems of airline passes are no more difficult than the valuation of prizes
received in-kind. Moreover, even under the Tax Reform Act, airline passes
must be valued since passes issued to an employee's parents (as opposed to
his spouse, his child, or himself) are taxable fringe benefits valued at their
fair market value.
C Accounting Burden: The Airline Industry Versus The Restaurant
Industry
Despite the certain gift-like attributes of tips and the administrative incon-
venience to restaurant owners/employers, tip income constitutes gross in-
come to the employee and requires additional bookkeeping and reporting by
the employer. Congress and the courts have consistently treated tips re-
ceived by waiters and taxicab drivers, and "tokes" received by casino deal-
ers, as taxable income.8 4 Despite the gratuitous element in tips or tokes,
78. 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at 284-85 (Tax Executives Institute statement of position
on taxation of fringe benefits).
79. 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at 146 (statement of Monica Kaufmann, Secretary-Treas-
urer, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants).
80. See supra note 75.
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a)(2); Rev. Rul. 510, 1969-2 C.B. 23.
82. Turner v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 464 (1974).
83. McCoy v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 841 (1962).
84. See, e.g., Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1976) ("tokes"); Roberts v.
Commissioner, 10 T.C. 581 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1949) (tip income).
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these amounts are not considered gifts because they are given in response to
services rendered and clearly enrich the recipient. Although tokes are given
spontaneously, they do not proceed from a "detached and disinterested gen-
erosity.""5 Like airline passes, tips provide a clear economic benefit to em-
ployees; yet, the Tax Reform Act treats airline passes as excludible income.
Under the authority of Code section 446(b), if a taxpayer has not kept a
record of his income, the Commissioner may compute taxable income under
a method he deems reflective of such income. This idea of a forced computa-
tion was recently imposed on restaurant employees despite great industry
opposition.16 As of April 1, 1983, if the total reported tips for any payroll
period are less than eight percent of gross receipts for that period, the restau-
rant must allocate the difference among employees, and report this amount
to the Secretary annually.8 7 The employee must be furnished with a state-
ment showing the amount of tips that were thereby allocated to him. 8 Em-
ployers of "large food or beverage establishments"8 9 must additionally
report to the Secretary certain information regarding gross receipts, charge
receipts and charged tips, and tips reported to them.9° The 1984 Act pro-
vides that either a majority of employees or an employer may petition the
Secretary to reduce the percentage to be allocated, but not below two
percent. 9'
There is no reason to distinguish between the restaurant and airline indus-
tries on the matter of administrative inconvenience. It would not be more
inconvenient to require the airline industry to keep records of its employees'
pass requests than for a large food or beverage establishment to keep track of
its employees' tips.
85. Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d at 877-78 (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 285-86 (1960)).
86. See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at G-6 (Aug. 10, 1983).
87. I.R.C. § 6053(c)(3) (1982). This Code section was added by the Tax Equity and Fis-
cal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 314, 96 Stat. 324-603 (hereinafter cited
as TEFRA].
88. I.R.C. § 6053(c)(2) (1982).
89. A large food or beverage establishment is defined as one that normally employs more
than 10 employees who customarily receive tips for serving food or beverages. I.R.C.
§ 6053(c)(4) (1982). For tax years following 1982, an individual owning 50% or more of the
corporation operating the establishment is not an employee for the above purpose. 1984 Tax
Act, supra note I, at § 1072.
90. I.R.C. § 6053(c)(1) (1982).
91. 1984 Tax Act, supra note 1, at § 1072 (effective for years after December 31, 1982).
[Vol. 34:425
New Fringe Benefit Legislation
IV. QUALIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUSION?
A. No Additional Cost Benefits. Revenue Foregone
Responding to criticism that "revenue foregone" be included in determin-
ing whether a fringe benefit is "no-additional-cost", 92 the lawmakers in-
cluded any revenue foregone because the employer provided the service to
the employee rather than a customer in the definition of "cost."' 93 Yet, im-
mediately after stating this requirement, the House Report explains that no
additional cost is incurred because, for example, employees fill otherwise
empty seats on airplanes and trains.94 Interestingly, Congress admits that
revenue foregone is an element of cost, but has not conditioned the exclusion
of free airline passes to employees on the requirement that employers first
offer the seats on a standby basis at low cost to the public. Judging from the
success of low cost airfares and airlines resulting from deregulation,95 there
is no sound basis for the proposition that free passes to standby employees
do not effect a revenue loss to their employers. Thus, it appears that "reve-
nue foregone" has little meaning in the statute.
B. Line of Business Limitation
One purported reason for the fringe benefit legislation is the recognition
that employers have business reasons for offering employees free or dis-
counted products that are sold to the public.96 Essentially, when employers
provide no-additional-cost services or qualified employee discounts, they
want their employees to familiarize themselves with the goods or services. If
business reasons are paramount, these fringe benefits could be excludible
from income as working condition fringe benefits (that is, if they meet the
ordinary and necessary requirements of all business deductions).97 It is
questionable, however, that the business motive of acquainting the employee
with the employer's products will be sufficient to constitute a working condi-
tion fringe benefit where the employee might also have a personal reason for
using the product or service. For example, in Pevsner v. Commissioner,98 the
92. See Note, Federal Income Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1141, 1163 (1976).
93. I.R.C. § 132(b)(2) (1984); see 1983 H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 289.
94. 1983 H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 289.
95. See, e.g., People Express to Start Service to Los Angeles: United Matches Fare, Wall St.
J., June 8, 1984, at 4, col 4; Salpulkas, People Express Sets New, Cut Rate Coast Flights, N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1984, at D6, col. 1.
96. See 1983 H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 286.
97. See I.R.C. § 162 (1984); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-1 to 1.162-22 (1984).
98. 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'g 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1979). The taxability of
the discount the employee received on the clothing was not an issue here.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a deduction to a
boutique manager for the cost and maintenance of the Yves St. Laurent
clothes and accessories that she was required to wear by her employer. The
Court found that her clothing was objectively adaptable for personal use.99
In addition, the mixed business/personal rationale does not explain why
the 1984 legislation includes those discounts offered to the employee's spouse
and dependent children, widow(er)s of former employees, and retired em-
ployees and their families as nontaxable fringe benefits." They do not need
to be familiar with the employer's products or services. In fact, this exclu-
sion is contrary to the requirement that the taxpayer's family have a signifi-
cant bona fide business purpose for incurring expenses when claiming a
business deduction ordinarily available only to the employee. ° ' It is also
difficult to appreciate how this business purpose rationale applies to free
passes or discounts occasioned by reciprocal arrangements between often
times rival, or at least competitive, companies.
10 2
Finally, the taxation of fringe benefits does not mean that employees will
have to pay for presently free or discounted products or services in the same
way that the public must buy these products or services with after-tax dol-
lars. The employee may continue to receive valuable benefits from his em-
ployer, but will be taxed on these benefits. If, for example, an airline
employee in the thirty percent tax bracket receives a free pass worth a mini-
mum of $500 to the public, he will pay $150 to the federal government for a
$500 ticket. Given the savings of $350, most employees will continue to take
advantage of this benefit and will familiarize themselves with the employer's
service. Similarly, a thirty percent bracket employee offered a twenty per-
cent discount on merchandise costing $1,000, will pay a tax of only $60 on a
$200 benefit, resulting in an effective price reduction of $140. The issue
then, is not whether employees should be allowed free or discounted benefits,
but whether Congress equitably decided to exclude these benefits from
taxation.
99. 682 F.2d at 470-71.
100. See I.R.C. § 132(0(1), (2) (1984).
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(c) (1984), requiring that a taxpayer's spouse or other family
member who accompanies the taxpayer on a business trip show a bona fide business purpose in
order to deduct those expenses.
102. See 1984 Tax Act, supra note 1, at § 1072 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132(g)(2)). As
originally written, the fringe benefit exclusion did not extend to reciprocal agreements between
employers. Compare 1984 Tax Act, supra note I (present law) with 1983 Hearings, supra note
2, at 15-30 (H.R. 3525 as introduced and H.R. 3525 as reported by the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means). H.R. 3525, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 633-
37 (1983). It should be noted that H.R. 3525, which concerned only fringe benefits, was incor-
porated by the Committee into H.R. 4170, the comprehensive tax reform act reported out on
Oct. 5, 1984. See 1983 H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 11.
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V. ADOPTION OF A NEW INDEX
Some commentators have suggested that a benefit loses its nature as com-
pensation where the employer incurs no additional cost in providing the ser-
vice.' ° 3 This approach, however, views "compensation" from the
perspective of the employer, not the employee.
By instituting the no-additional-cost standard for determining income,
Congress has for the first time implicitly shifted its focus from the income
recipient to the payor. While this standard is descriptive, and thus accom-
modating, of the former nonstatutory treatment of these fringe benefits, it
distorts the traditional theories of taxation.
Prior to the recent legislation, the use of the payor's expense had only
been used where it enabled the taxing authorities to establish the best esti-
mate of the fair market value of the benefit received."° For example, in
United States v. Gotcher, °5 a taxpayer was permitted to exclude the value of
a trip to Germany because it served a legitimate business purpose of his
employer and the payors. The court found that the value of the trip was
equal to the amounts expended by the taxpayer's employer and the other
payors.
Generally, the equivalence between an employer's cost deduction and an
employee's compensation is fortuitous. Certainly, most compensation is in-
come to the employee and deductible by the employer in the same amounts.
As the Supreme Court stated in Duberstein, however, when reviewing the
fact that the transferor took a business deduction for the "gift" of a Cadillac
to the taxpayer,
it is doubtless relevant to the over-all inference that the trans-
feror treats a payment as a business deduction, or that the trans-
feror is a corporate entity. But these inferences cannot be stated in
absolute terms. Neither factor is a shibboleth. The taxing statute
does not make nondeductibilty by the transferor a condition on the
'gift' exclusion. . . . The conclusion whether a transfer amounts
to a 'gift' is one that must be reached on consideration of all the
factors. 1
0 6
There is little merit to the contention that the use of a fair market value
standard of includibility would destroy "the parallel treatment between the
employee and the employer, since the effect would be to impute income to
103. See 1983 H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 286; 129 CONG. REC. S13,295 (daily ed. Sept. 30,
1983) (statement of Sen. Jepsen); A.B.A. Comm. on General Income Tax Problems, Tax Sec-
tion Recommendation No. 1980-1, 33 TAX LAW. 993, 1000 (1980).
104. See Note, supra note 92, at 1157.
105. 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968).
106. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 287-88 (1960).
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the employee in excess of that expended by the employer."""° Rather, there
is no reason to require any parallel treatment when income is computed on
the sole basis of the benefit to the employee.
There are many instances where such equivalence cannot be found. Since
the restauranteur does not pay waiters' tips, he is not allowed a correspond-
ing deduction. The waiter, however, must include this amount as income.
The tipper, who may be using these services for personal and not business
reasons, also may not be able to take a deduction."18 With respect to prizes,
the recipient must include as income the fair market value of the prize at the
date of its acquisition. The corporation providing the prize, however, is lim-
ited to a deduction equal to the cost of the prize.' 0 9
Indeed, many employer deductions are either disallowed or limited by the
tax statutes even though the recipient must include a higher, full amount in
his income. To be deductible, an expense must be "ordinary and necessary."
Amounts paid in excess of reasonable compensation are not deductible." 0
Similarly, amounts paid for certain travel, entertainment and gifts are sub-
ject to substantiation and other requirements that may result in their disal-
lowance."' Specifically, business gifts are limited to a maximum annual
deduction of twenty-five dollars for each recipient." 2 Certain business de-
ductions, such as illegal bribes and kickbacks,"' fines and penalties, "' and
treble damages from antitrust violations," 5 are subject to disallowance for
public policy reasons."16
In addition, the requirement of an equivalence has only been found to run
the other way around. For example, an employer's deduction will be disal-
lowed until the employee has included the value of stock, given as compensa-
tion, in his income." 7 Similarly, a deduction will be disallowed where
expenses relating to a deduction are attributable to taxable income.''
8
Finally, the focus on an employer's incremental cost to determine if an
107. 1983 Hearings, supra note 2, at 281 (statement of the Tax Executives Institute, Inc.).
108. I.R.C. § 262 (1984) denies a deduction for personal living expenses.
109. Rev. Rul. 510, 1969-2 C.B. 23.
110. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-7 to 1.162-9 (1960).
111. See I.R.C. § 274 (1984).
112. See id. § 274(b)(1).
113. Id. § 162(c).
114. Id. § 162(f).
115. Id. § 162(g).
116. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (denial of a busi-
ness deduction because its allowance would frustrate state policy found in the maximum
weight laws); Mazzei v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497 (1974) (denial of a theft loss for a theft
among thieves).
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a) (1978).
118. I.R.C. § 265(1) (1984).
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amount constitutes income (instead of on what the employee receives) is ad-
mittedly a convenient way of codifying the status quo treatment of fringe
benefits. It is not, however, a very useful or equitable measure of taxable
income.
VI. SECTION 83
Added by the 1969 Tax Reform Act," 9 Code section 83 was intended to
remove the preferential treatment given to restricted stock plans as opposed
to other types of deferred compensation and qualified stock options. Prior to
the enactment of section 83, an employer could give an employee stock sub-
ject to the restriction, for example, that it not be sold within five years.
Although the employee could vote the stock and receive dividends, he was
not taxed on the receipt of the stock until the restriction expired."' Section
83 now requires that the employee be taxed on the value of the property
upon receipt, less any amount paid, unless the property is subject to a sub-
stantial risk of forfeiture."' 1 The employer is allowed a business deduction
for the transfer in the year in which the value of such property is included in
the employee's income. 22 Although the statute originally was motivated by
a desire specifically to tax stock given to employees in the year of receipt, it
applies generally to the transfer of all property in exchange for the perform-
ance of services. 1
23
Several commentators have suggested 2 4 that all noncash fringe benefits,
except for working condition and de minimis fringe benefits, could be cov-
ered by section 83, as well as section 6 1.12' Like other in-kind compensa-
tion, these fringe benefits, including travel passes and tuition remission
benefits, should be includible in income.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rather than reducing the inequitable treatment of in-kind and cash com-
pensation, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 merely codifies the special benefits
accorded to noncash compensation given by certain industries to their em-
119. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
509.
120. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 119 (1969).
121. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1984).
122. Id. § 83(h).
123. Id. § 83(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1984).
124. See, e.g., Simon, A New Look at the Taxation of Fringe Benefits, in 1983 HEARINGS,
supra note 2, at 326; Comment, Fringe Benefits, Proposed Section 84, and Tax Policy, 7 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 627, 631 (1980); Note, supra note 92, at 1157.
125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1), (2) (1984).
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ployees. Employees of retail stores receive their discounts tax-free; airline
employees enjoy their free passes tax-free; and university employees educate
their children at government expense. This erosion of the tax base is difficult
to justify. There are no social policy reasons to explain the preferential treat-
ment accorded these employees. If there were significant business reasons to
justify the exclusion of these benefits, they would already have been excluded
as working condition fringe benefits. If their value were truly small, they
would have been excluded as de minimus fringe benefits. Considering the
administrative burden placed on the restaurant industry, reinforced by the
Tax Reform Act of 1984, to report and, if necessary, to allocate tips among
its employees, these fringe benefits cannot be explained in terms of adminis-
trative convenience. Finally, because an employer incurs no additional cost
(except, of course, "revenue foregone"-a term rendered meaningless by the
1984 Act), there is no merit to the corollary that an employee's benefit is not
"compensation." By focusing on the employer's cost rather than on the
traditional examination of what the employee receives, Congress is departing
from a basic principle of what constitutes taxable income. This departure,
again, has no meaningful rationale; it appears to be merely a means of codi-
fying the historical treatment of certain fringe benefits without examining
the inequities created by this erosion of the tax base.
Essentially, the exclusions for working condition and de minimus fringe
benefits may be justified on the grounds of tax simplification and administra-
tive convenience. The exclusions for no-additional-cost services, qualified
employee discounts, and qualified tuition reductions, however, should be
repealed.
Although this article focuses on the example of the airline employee, hotel
and other transportation employees also receive no-additional--costs
fringe benefits.
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